INTRODUCTION
Factfinders in civil cases must often make a constellation of decisions, such as assigning responsibility and blame, making compensation and (sometimes) giving out punishment. These decisions are likely to evoke numerous social and moral concerns and, therefore, inevitably implicate a variety of instrumental and symbolic goals. We argue that descriptions of legal decision making that fail to consider the psychological interplay among these different goals are likely to come up short in their efforts to explicate the ways in which jurors and other factfinders make decisions in civil cases. Instead, we suggest that decision making in civil cases can profitably be thought of as a process by which decision makers attempt to maximally satisfy a wide variety of goals in parallel.
In contrast to many traditional legal and economic portrayals of legal decision making which posit that decision makers can pursue single motives as instructed, Part I argues that jurors and other finders-of-fact deciding civil cases ought to be thought of as pursuing many different goals simultaneously. This Part briefly describes many of the goals that may underlie decision making in civil cases and introduces a set of basic goal management principles that define how these goals interrelate. Part II describes social psychological research that suggests that legal decision makers may be motivated to pursue a variety of goals in addition to the traditional goals of determining fault, compensating plaintiffs and deterring defendants. Different motives for distributing resources, value expressive goals and a need to restore the proper relative moral balance between the parties may all play a role in civil decision making. In Part III, we propose that decision makers may attempt simultaneously to satisfy these multiple goals through a process of parallel constraint satisfaction.
I. DECISION MAKER GOALS

A.
Traditional Legal and Economic Models of Decision Making
Traditional descriptions of legal decision making presume, at least implicitly, that jurors and other legal factfinders are driven by a single motive at any given time and are able to focus on one purpose to the exclusion of others in making a given decision. Further, these descriptions assume that the single purpose on which decision makers will focus is the one that the legal system finds appropriate for making the judgment in question. Since the legal system regards different purposes as appropriate for the different decisions it asks decision makers to make about a single case, it assumes that the decision makers will rotate into place the decision rule that the justice system instructs them to use. The system assumes further that decision makers will apply that (and only that) decision rule for the decision in question. This view of system conforming, single rule governed factfinders underlies numerous legal rules that assume decision makers can compartmentalize information and make independent judgments. For example, decision makers are asked to isolate their reactions to extra-evidentiary information, such as pretrial publicity or inadmissible evidence,, from their evaluation of the trial evidence. Similarly, decision makers are expected to use certain evidence for some purposes, but not for others. For example, decision makers may use prior record testimony to impeach a defendant's credibility as a witness but not to determine his or her culpability. 2 Decision makers are also often asked to reach independent verdicts on multiple claims, for multiple plaintiffs or against multiple defendants in a single trial. 3 Sometimes it is not the trial evidence that requires compartmentalization, but the rules or motives for the decision or set of decisions made. For instance, in civil trials decision ,makers are expected to compartmentalize their decisions so ,that liability, compensation and punitive damages judgments are each made independently. Decision makers are presumed ito pursue different goals through each decision. Specifically, decision makers are expected to be driven by a motive of causal accuracy in making liability determinations, by the plaintifffocused motive of compensation in making compensatory damages determinations and by the defendant-focused motives of retribution and deterrence in making punitive damages determinations. 4 In fact, it becomes more complicated. Given the different decision motives, decision makers are asked to use each decision to achieve separate objectives and may, therefore, be asked to consider certain evidence as relevant to only some , jurors are instructed to set aside (to erase) information that is already available to them and to reach their verdicts based simply on the legally permissible evidence which has been presented at trial. While courts recognize that jurors cannot be expected to proceed in this fashion on some occasions, granting a change of venue or a mistrial as a remedy, the reliance on simple admonitions to disregard inadmissible information reflects a perception of the jury as a blank slate on which trial testimony can be written and erased."). purpose of punitive damages is to offset any deficit in the ability of compensatory damages to deter harmful behavior caused by any ability the defendant has to escape detection or liability. 8 In accordance with this theory, the likelihood that the harmful conduct will be detected ought to be related to the appropriate degree of punishment. 9 Under this model, decision makers are expected to render punitive damages decisions that vary inversely with the likelihood of detection; their decisions are considered to be erroneous if they do not.' 1 Even when these traditional legal and economic models are viewed as purely normative or prescriptive-rather than descriptive of actual decision making-their use as a baseline or benchmark for evaluating jury performance implicitly adopts the models' narrow goal conceptualization. Much empirical research into legal decision making, however, demonstrates that decision makers have difficulty with the tasks these models require; the models assume that decision makers can select and exclusively use a single, legally appropriate decision rule. Decision makers have trouble, for example, ignoring pretrial publicity" or inadmissible evidence; 2 using specified evidence for some purposes but not society begins to lose more from deterrence efforts than from the offenses it deters" in contrast to "complete" deterrence in which the goal is to "stop offenders from committing offensive acts." Hylton, supra note 5, at 421.
8 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 4, at 873-74. It follows from these observations that a crucial question for consideration is whether injurers sometimes escape liability for harms for which they are responsible. If they do, the level of liability imposed on them when they are found liable needs to exceed compensatory damages so that, on average, they will pay for the harm that they cause. This excess liability can be labeled "punitive damages," and failure to impose it would result in inadequate BEHAV. 37 (1985) .
14 For empirical studies of multiple decisions in civil trials see, e.g., Irwin A.
exclusion of other goals. 6 In contrast to the legal and economic models that portray jurors and other finders-of-fact as singlemindedly pursuing individual, separable goals, we suggest that legal decision makers attempt to best use the available verdict options to satisfy numerous goals simultaneously.
B. Decision Makers as Goal Managers
Civil cases evoke multiple social and moral concerns, both normative and non-normative, that factor into legal decision making. For example, legal decision makers may attempt to reach a verdict that is consistent with the available evidence.' They may attempt to achieve distributive justice by assessing liability proportionally with fault or by allocating resources to each party in proportion to that party's need. 8 They may seek to compensate plaintiffs appropriately, avoiding overcompensation and undercompensation. They may endeavor to effect deterrence in some measure, exact retribution or restore an appropriate balance of justice between the parties.' 9 Just as the law more generally may serve an expressive function,'° so too may jurors attempt to express symbolic values through their verdicts. 2 ' In addition, jurors may show reactance in the face of blatant manipulative tactics by counsel, attempt to comply with economic logic and attempt to reconcile conflicting (intrajuror and interjuror) interpretations of the judge's instructions. At the same time, they may desire to struggle to satisfy this assortment of goals, the legal decision making task affords only limited mechanisms through which to do so-primarily, a liability verdict, compensatory damages and, sometimes, punitive damages. The array of possible goals and the avenues available to accomplish them are interrelated in complex ways. We propose four basic goal management principles that describe the interrelated nature of these goals and actions. First, the principle of equifinality holds that some goals may be alternately satisfied through multiple pathways. Decision makers, for example, can compensate the plaintiff most straightforwardly through a compensatory damage award, but can also award punitive damages to achieve this goal. 23 Second, the principle of best fit holds that pathways may sometimes fulfill some goals better than others. For example, compensatory damages may serve compensatory goals better than they do retributive goals. Third, the principle of multifinality holds that a particular pathway may accomplish multiple goals simultaneously. Some of the decision makers' objectives may be consistent with each other and may be achieved concurrently. Requiring a defendant to pay money to a plaintiff, for example, may serve to compensate the plaintiff, to educate the defendant and others about socially acceptable conduct and also to punish the defendant. 24 Similarly, a punitive damage award may fulfill goals of punishment and deterrence. Finally, the principle of goal incompatibility holds that some objectives will inevitably conflict and, thus, be difficult or impossible to satisfy concurrently. For instance, a particular punitive damages award may be thought to punish appropriately the defendant, but to overcompensate the plaintiff. The challenge for jurors and other legal factfinders is to reach a verdict that best reconciles these different goals. 25 II.
COMPETING GOALS
In addition to the traditional goals of the civil justice system of determining liability, compensating plaintiffs and deterring defendants, we suggest that there are numerous other goals that play a role in deciding cases. When assessing compensatory damages, for example, legal decision makers may consider the relative needs of the parties rather than solely attempting to reach outcomes that are proportionate to fault. Moreover, decision makers may use their decisions as much to "make statements" and endorse or reinforce community values as to influence behavior directly. Thus, in trying to understand decision making in civil cases, expressive goals are an important consideration. In addition, legal decision makers may be concerned not just with a commodified conception of compensation, but also with restoring the moral balance between the parties to the lawsuit.
A.
Distributive Justice
Models of distributive justice attempt to explain how people determine whether an outcome is fair. In general, the law is intended to follow a model of distributive justice based on allocation of fault such that a person is considered blameworthy when she engages in conduct that causes intended harm or involves an undue risk of harm. 26 Under a model of distributive justice based on fault, the losses resulting from an injury-producing incident are allocated to each party in proportion to that party's fault. A pure comparative negligence standard can be thought of as following a proportionality model. 27 Psychologically, however, it is plausible that in attempting to realize distributive justice among the parties, decision makers may be motivated not only by a desire to achieve an allocation of loss proportionate to fault, but also by 25 In Part III, we describe a constraint satisfaction perspective that might be deployed to formalize these principles. [Vol. 68: 4 B.
Value Expression
Another class of goals that may influence legal decisions is related to the expressive functions such decisions can serve. The law functions expressively to the extent that its role is more symbolic than instrumental, as it focuses on "'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly." 33 . Similarly, civil factfinders who hold a defendant liable for a civil wrong and require that defendant to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries make statements about socially acceptable and unacceptable behavior as well as the appropriate relationship between the parties. In particular, punishment, including civil punishment, is said to serve, in part, the symbolic function of expressing "moral condemnation," 4 "attitudes of resentment and indignation, and . . . judgments of disapproval and reprobation." 35 As Joel Feinberg says of punitive damages: "What more dramatic way of vindicating his violated right can be imagined than to have a court thus forcibly condemn its violation through the symbolic machinery of punishment?" 6 Although deterrence theories can accommodate such expressions by interpreting them post hoc as threats or incentives, we believe that a rational choice perspective fails to capture the complexity and emotional resonance of these more symbolic messages. The following discussion of attitude functions, sacred value protections, taboo trade-offs and incommensurability highlights this complexity.
Attitude Functions
The functional attitude tradition in social psychology suggests that attitude expressions may serve a variety of functions and may even serve more than one function or goal simultaneously. Importantly, in addition to holding and Sunstein, supra note 20, at 2024. 34 REV. 670 (1980) . In a similar way, the Heuristic-Systematic Model of persuasion proposes that systematic processing of attitude-relevant information is motivated not only by an instrumental concern for accuracy (i.e., "achieving valid attitudes that square with relevant facts"), but also by expressive concerns such as defense motivation (i.e., "the desire to form or to defend particular attitudinal positions") and impression motivation (i.e., "the desire to express attitudes that are socially acceptable" 
Sacred Value Protection
Philip Tetlock has recently proposed a model of behavior that suggests that, in addition to other goals, people may attempt to symbolically affirm core values that they believe have been threatened. 4 3 Specifically, people will act to defend those "sacred values" that are "implicitly or explicitly treat [ed] as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values." 4 In his "sacred value protection model," Tetlock provides evidence that, in the face of a perceived threat to one of these central beliefs, people will endeavor to "protect their private selves and public identities from moral contamination by impure thoughts and deeds." 45 The that people will respond with moral outrage when core values are threatened. 46 Moral outrage has been shown to manifest itself in negative evaluations of, and negative emotional responses, such as anger, toward individuals who have intruded on closely held values. Moral outrage also leads to greater support for the punishment of those who have threatened these moral norms. 47 This connection between feelings of moral outrage and punitiveness is also supported by research on the psychology of punitive damages awards, which has demonstrated that jurors' feelings of moral outrage about a defendant's conduct predict the degree to which they believe that the defendant ought to be punished. 48 Second, the model predicts that threats to sacred values will elicit expressions of moral cleansing that are designed to distance the witness from the offense and to buttress the threatened principles. 9 In this way, the witness affirms the closely held value and upholds his or her connection to the moral community.° For example, people who observe a decision that threatens a sacred value, such as the selling of bodily organs to the highest bidder, are more likely to volunteer for a campaign to promote organ donation than are those who do not observe such a decision." 1 This behavior serves to distance them from the offensive trade-off and affirms the threatened sacred value. babies, loyalty or love strike most people as distasteful and morally offensive."' Such negative reactions are likely due, in part, to the cognitive difficulty that individuals have with comparing and making trade-offs between incommensurable entities." The lack of a common metric for evaluating things such as money and love make any comparison and attempt to make trade-offs cognitively challenging. However, Fiske and Tetlock suggest that this "resistance also runs deeper: there are moral limits to fungibility. People reject certain comparisons because they feel that seriously considering the relevant trade-offs would undercut their self-images and social identities as moral beings." 63 Fiske and Tetlock invoke the concept of "constitutive commensurability" to describe instances in which "entering one value into a trade-off calculus with the other subverts or undermines that value. This means that our relationships with each other preclude certain comparisons among values." 64 In these cases, it is not merely that the trade-off is cognitively complex or that we think that a proper quantitative valuation has not been achieved monetarily, i.e., that not enough money has been paid for the baby or the organ. Rather, the difficulty comes from a belief that to value some things in monetary terms is qualitatively incorrect; such comparisons invoke the wrong relational template and, accordingly, the valuation is of the wrong type. 65 6' Tetlock et al., supra note 43, at 854 ("To transgress this boundary, to attach a monetary value to one's friendships, children, or loyalty to one's country, is to disqualify oneself from the accompanying social roles."); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 47, at 292 ("People probably cannot make reliable, meaningful comparisons across relational models, and they experience deep unease when asked to do so."). [01nly reassurance that the wrong-doer has indeed been punished by the collective (whose norms have been violated) should be sufficient to restore the moral status quo ante and to reduce whatever cognitive and emotional unease was produced in individual observers by the original trade-off transgression. Indeed, punishments are forceful impositions of the relational models 67 themselves, reestablishing their validity and hegemony. Accordingly, we might expect civil decision makers to react negatively to, and to express their discomfort punitively against, defendants who have made or entertained taboo tradeoffs. 68 
Taboo Trade-Offs and Incommensurability
6' For discussions of incommensurability in law generally
Resistance to Cost-Benefit Analysis
Legal scholars have also noted this deeper reaction to taboo trade-offs. Cass Sunstein writes that many people find it jarring to hear that, in light of actual occupational choices, a worker values his life at (say) eight million dollars, or that the protection of a life is "worth" eight million dollars. These claims are jarring not because we believe infinite social resources should be devoted to occupational safety. The claims are jarring because of the widespread perception that a life is not instrumental to some aggregate social goal, but worthy in itself-a belief in tension with applying the language of prices to human life. This is a plausible concern even if one ultimately concludes that (say) an eight million dollar expenditure is fully appropriate in cases of lives at risk. Certainly intrinsic goods do not have infinite value for purposes of law and policy. But even though they do not, the fact that we find it jarring to hear that a life is "worth" a specified amount of money is socially desirable, and not a product of simple confusion.
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Consistent with this observation and the theory of taboo trade-offs, recent empirical evidence suggests that civil jurors may be more punitive against companies that undertake costbenefit analyses in making safety decisions than they are against those who do not. W. Kip Viscusi examined the effect of corporate cost-benefit analyses on mock jurors using a scenario in which a defendant automobile company manufactured a line of cars with a defective electrical system which led to a specified number of burn deaths per year.° The study used two versions of the case; in one version, the company used a costbenefit analysis to decide that it should not change the defective design to prevent this risk. 71 Jurors appeared to react negatively to evidence that the company had conducted a costbenefit analysis. Viscusi found that jurors were more likely to award punitive damages and made marginally larger punitive damage awards when the company conducted a cost-benefit analysis."
These findings, though preliminary, 3 are consistent with common intuitions about the effects of corporate costbenefit analysis on jurors. 74 The theory of taboo trade-offs provides a psychologically sophisticated explanation for these findings and suggests that symbolic motives may have an influence on legal judgments. It is possible that by punishing and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 287 n.135 ("It seems widely agreed by both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys that credible trial evidence of cost-benefit balancing-so-called 'trading off lives against dollars'-makes punitive damages particularly likely. This is in stark contrast to the fact that economic efficiency-and deterrence aimed at economic efficiency-requires cost-benefit balancing."). See also Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 1977 , at 18 (describing the controversy over the revelation that the Ford Motor Company relied on a cost-benefit analysis in deciding against an eleven dollar safety alteration in each Ford Pinto, despite their anticipation that this could prevent almost two hundred burn deaths). the corporation through a punitive damage award, the mock jurors were attempting to distance themselves morally from the proscribed trade-off and symbolically reaffirm the value that they and their moral community place on life and safety. 75
C.
Restoring Moral Balance
Valuing the Victim
In similar ways, legal decision makers may also attempt to express support for the value of the victim of the wrongdoing through their verdicts. Philosopher Jean Hampton has developed an expressive theory of retribution based on the messages that wrongful behavior and sanctions send about the relative worth of the parties. 7 " Hampton posits that [a] person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to another when she treats that person in a way that is precluded by that person's value, and/or by representing him as worth far less than his actual value; or in other words, when the meaning of her action is such that she diminishes him, and by doing so, represents herself as elevated with respect to him, thereby according herself a value that she does not have.
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When a wrongdoer engages in behavior that does not appropriately respect the value of another person, it "sends a false message about the value of the victim relative to the [wrongdoer] ." 78 Such an action symbolically "demonstrates that she believes the worth of the victim makes such treatment permissible." 7 9
To illustrate the message about the victim's worth sent by a wrongful act, Hampton uses the example of an asbestos plant, where managers know the health risks, but fail to warn and protect their employees.
Their actions demonstrate how important the company's profits are to these managers: in virtue of their importance, they regard it as permissible to allow the employees to assume these risks to their health, rather than pay the costs necessary to do something to lower the risks and thereby lower profits. Those who commit such crimes essentially reason: "Nothing personal, but I've got to harm you in these ways given my interests-which are so important that you can be used or damaged to serve them." Such reasoning explains why these people inflict treatment upon others which is disrespectful of their value as persons.80
Similarly, Marc Galanter and David Luban argue that "culpably harming another person or being culpably negligent expresses a false view of the wrongdoer's value relative to that of the victim. . . . 'I can be negligent in marketing Dalkon Shields because you, the customer, do not matter very much."' 8 '
Hampton argues that civil punishment is a way of attempting to reestablish the value of equality; that is to "remake the world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer's events have attempted to establish, thereby lowering the wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and annulling the act of diminishment." 2 Because the message sent by the wrongful act "threatens to reinforce belief in the wrong theory of value by the community," 3 punishment is sought that "symbolizes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim." 4 Galanter and Luban characterize this purpose for punishment as inflicting an "expressive defeat" on the wrongdoer. 85 This philosophical account of retribution is consistent with the social psychological account provided by equity theory.
80 Hampton, supra note 35, at 8. 81 Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1432.
82 Hampton, supra note 76, at 1686-87. See also Hampton, supra note 35, at 12 ("a way of denying a false message about worth, and thus a way of vindicating the worth of those who have been victims of wrongdoing").
Hampton, supra note 76, at 1678. 84 Hampton, supra note 77, at 125. See also Hampton, supra note 35, at 13 ("[Jiust as the crime has symbolic meaning, so too does the punishment.... the punishment 'takes back' the demeaning message .... the evidence of value loss provided by the crime is nullified by the new evidence provided by the subordination effected through the punishment."); Hampton, supra note 76, at 1686 ("[Rletribution is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the construction of an event that not only repudiates the action's message of superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity."). According to equity theorists, a wrongdoer's transgression against an injured party results in an inequity in their relationship; that is, the wrong creates a moral imbalance between the parties. 6 Moreover, equity theory posits that "when individuals find themselves participating in inequitable relationships, they become distressed. The more inequitable the relationship, the more distress individuals feel."" Upon discovering that a relationship is inequitable, individuals are motivated to attempt to restore equity to the relationship. 88 This is true, not only for participants in the relationship, but also for impartial observers, such as jurors or other legal factfinders. "When participants are unable-or refuse-to restore equity, impartial observers often intervene and attempt to set things right." 9 Thus, civil verdicts may reflect, in part, decision makers' attempts to restore moral balance to the relationship between the parties.
In affirming the proper moral balance between the parties, civil sanctions may restore corrective justice by adjusting "an unjustified state of affairs between an injurer and a victim, when the injurer's activity has caused the injustice, so that such changes bring about a just state of affairs between them, and one that is related in a morally appropriate way to the status quo ante." 9° Interestingly, tort litigants themselves may share this restorative goal with jurors. Both tort plaintiffs and tort defendants appear to care as much about receiving dignified and respectful treatment, and a chance to "tell their story," as about the actual monetary outcomes at stake. 
Punitive Damages as Restorative
In one demonstration that jurors may pursue restorative or expressive goals, Michelle Chernikoff Anderson and Robert MacCoun examined the potential influences on juror decision making of whether the punitive damage award is to be paid to the plaintiff or to the state. 92 While punitive damage awards are traditionally paid to the plaintiff who brought the case, a number of states have passed legislation that allocates some portion of the punitive damage award to the state. 9 " Such legislation responds to concerns that plaintiffs receive a windfall when they receive punitive damage awards that are intended to punish the defendant, in addition to damages intended to compensate them for their losses. 94 Counter to many commentators' intuition that allocating punitive damages awards to the state will result in an increase in the likelihood and size of such awards, 99 " See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive full compensation for their injuries-but no more. Even assuming that a punitive 'fine' should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated.").
95 First, it is thought that if punitive damages are awarded to the state, jurors will be relieved of any concern about awarding a windfall to the plaintiff and will feel free to fully punish the defendant. E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages: A Anderson and MacCoun found that mock jurors were more likely to award punitive damages in personal injury cases when they were to be awarded to the plaintiff than when they were to be awarded to the state. 9 This was true both when the state treasury was to receive the award" and when a consortium of relatively uncontroversial state funds was to receive the award. 8 RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 25 (1993) (finding that twenty-four of eighty-three participants awarded greater amounts of compensation when the money was to be paid directly to the plaintiff than when a penalty was to go to the government who would then compensate the injured party (only four participants paid less)). They conclude that "many people assign Writing about a non-commodified conception of compensation, Radin suggests that compensation can serve to restore the moral balance between the parties by "symboliz [ing] public respect for rights and public recognition of the transgressor's fault by requiring something important to be given up on one side and received on the other, even if there is no equivalence of value possible."''
Similarly, a punitive damages award, specifically required to be paid by the wrongdoer to the injured party, may affirm the appropriate value of the injured party vis-A-vis the wrongdoer.
Apologies
While the payment of money by the defendant to the plaintiff may sometimes serve the expressive purpose of reestablishing respect for the victim of wrongdoing, it may not always be the only or the most satisfactory pathway for accomplishing this goal. At least in some contexts, "the medium of monetary damages has very limited expressive power," 1°2 and may suggest an inappropriate valuing of the victim. 0 3
An alternative mechanism by which the appropriate moral balance between the parties can be restored is an apology given by the wrongdoer to the victim. Indeed, equity theorists have suggested that one possible means through which equity might be restored to the relationship between the parties is for the wrongdoer to offer an apology. 0 4 To apologize is to engage in a social "ritual whereby the wrongdoer can symbolically bring himself low (or raise us up)." 0 5 Jonathan Cohen suggests that, in some cases, "[p]aying monetary damages may help take care of the financial consequences of an injury, but it may take an apology to 'wipe the moral ledger' clean and construct an understanding of the injury and the relationship which both parties can accept. [glenuine apologies ... may be taken as the symbolic foci of secular remedial rituals that serve to recall and reaffirm allegiance to codes of behavior and belief whose integrity has been tested and challenged by transgression, whether knowingly or unwittingly. An apology thus speaks to an act that cannot be undone but that cannot go unnoticed without compromising the current and future relationship of the parties, the legitimacy of the violated rule, and the wider social web in which the participants are enmeshed.
0 7
Similarly, Hampton argues that, "by apologizing, we deny the diminishment of the victim, and our relative elevation, expressed by our wrongful action."' In this way, an apology offered by the transgressor to the victim may repair the breach created by the wrongful conduct and affirm the relative value of the parties." 9 Indeed, experimental studies of apologies in non-legal contexts have found that apologies, or other expressions of remorse, affect decision making in numerous ways, influencing attributions of responsibility for the incident, beliefs about the stability of the behavior (i.e., its likelihood of recurrence), perceptions of the character of the wrongdoer, affective reactions such as anger and sympathy, and behaviors such as forgiveness, aggression and recommendations for punishment. 1 In addition, experimental studies of reactions to criminal defendants have generally shown that remorseful defendants are perceived more positively and sentenced more leniently than are defendants who do not show remorse."' Similarly, the only experimental study of remorse in a civil case found that defendants in civil trials who show remorse were perceived more positively than those who did not." Remorse did not, however, appear to substitute for compensatory damages."' PSYCHOL. 64 (1976) (finding that participants gave a defendant in a drunk driving case who was described as "extremely remorseful" a shorter sentence than they did a defendant who gave "no indication of remorse"); & L. 393 (2002) . In his first study, Bornstein found that remorse had a significant positive effect on jurors' overall perceptions of the defendant. Id. at 400. In a second study, Bornstein found that defendants who expressed remorse were perceived as having suffered more than defendants who did not express remorse. Id. at 404.
113 Id. at 404. In the first study, male participants awarded marginally less in damages against the defendant, a physician, who expressed remorse at the time of trial or who did nothing to indicate remorse or lack thereof, than they did against defendants who were remorseless or who expressed remorse early (at the time of the [Vol. 68: 4
DECISION MAKERS AS GOAL MANAGERS
Thus, while offering an apology may not be the best mechanism by which to achieve compensation, it may be a better mechanism by which to express the proper relative moral positions of the parties than is a monetary award. To the extent that a voluntarily offered apology has restored equity between the parties in whole or in part, decision makers may view and use the sanctioning options available to them differently. Similarly, if civil decision makers were allowed to compel an apology as part of their verdict, they might choose to do so as a better way by which to restore equity." ' To the extent that the transgressor's wrongful conduct has conveyed the message that the offender considers the victim to be beneath her, an apology, voluntary or compelled, serves as a degradation ceremony that restores equal footing between victim and offender. If the apology involves a public expression of remorse, it may address the loss of face that the victim has suffered in front of the witnessing community. Moreover, the victim may see an apology that is enforced by a judgmental body, even if insincere, as a community statement that the victim is not to be treated as less valuable than others. The apology, then, sends a signal to the offender, the victim and the community that the victim is a valued and defended member of the community who cannot be treated in a fashion that diminishes her worth. incident). For female participants, remorse had no effect on damage awards. Id. at 399-400. In a second study, participants awarded more in compensatory damages against the defendant, who displayed remorse at the time of the event and then again at the time of trial, than they did in the other three conditions. Id. at 403. Given potential spillover between liability and damages decisions, it is unclear how these results might have been affected by telling jurors to assume that the defendant was liable. It is possible that jurors used the available decision to achieve goals that might otherwise have been achieved through the rendering of a liability verdict. 
III. LEGAL DECISION MAKING AS CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION
The above theories and studies suggest that legal decision makers make decisions that may reflect a variety of expressive goals in addition to other goals, including those contained in legal theory, that they hope to achieve. Accounts of legal decision making that ignore these expressive motives are likely to be inadequate. In addition, any account of legal decision making that portrays decision makers as having singular goals is likely to be insufficient. Thus, for example, accounts of legal decision making premised on decision makers being solely concerned with effecting optimal deterrence are unlikely to capture important aspects of the decision-making task. 11 Similarly, an account based solely on a picture of decision makers pursuing only expressive goals will miss important parts of the picture. Accordingly, accounts of legal decision making should comprise the variety of considerations that decision makers might bring to bear on their verdicts.
To this end, legal decision making might profitably be conceived of as a process of parallel constraint satisfaction that can be represented using connectionist models." 6 These models attempt to simulate situations in which the decision maker must integrate numerous "mutually interacting" elements (e.g., pieces of evidence, concepts, propositions or goals), that may or may not be consistent, into a coherent whole.' 17 A.
Parallel Constraint Satisfaction
When decision making is thought of as a constraint satisfaction network, the factors related to the decision are conceived of as nodes or elements in a neural-like network. Depending on the decision-making task, these elements can be pieces of evidence, propositions, concepts, goals and so on.
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Elements are connected by links that are weighted (indicating the strength of the link) and valenced (indicating the coherence or incoherence between the elements). The valence of the link represents the extent to which the elements constrain or reinforce each other. Elements may be coherent; that is, they are mutually supportive of each other. In contrast, elements may be incoherent, or negatively associated." 9 Thus, if one element explains or facilitates another element, the link between them will be positively valenced. Conversely, elements that are incompatible or that inhibit each other will be connected by negatively valenced links. 2° For example, one person might be observed hitting another in the shoulder. The blow might either be interpreted as a violent strike or as a friendly cuff. An element representing the blow itself would be positively linked to elements representing each of these interpretations; the elements representing these two inconsistent interpretations, however, would be connected by a negative link.
Decision making, then, is the process by which the "best compromise among the constraints" 2 ' is selected by "dividing a set of elements into accepted and rejected sets in a way that satisfies the most constraints." 2 2 This division is achieved based on each element's level of activation (e.g., ranging from -1 to 1). In a parallel constraint satisfaction connectionist When activation spreads through such a network, nodes with positive links will tend to activate each other and nodes with negative links will inhibit each other. Because the activation of a node is a result of all of its positive and negative links to other nodes, the final activation of the node can be thought of as a solution to all the constraints represented by the links. Moreover, because activation is spread in parallel among all the connected nodes, this process results in a global solution to the constraints among the entire set of nodes.
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This basic model, in which multiple, complexly related elements are simultaneously integrated in parallel to achieve a coherent decision, "is general enough to be applicable to any judgment task that requires the integration of many sources of 123 Id. at 30-31. Within the model, it is possible to link favored elements (such as empirical data) to an element that is set at a maximum activation. This gives priority to those elements, at least initially, as the model updates. contradictory evidence presented at trial. 132 In a model of explanatory coherence, decision makers "construct an interpretation that fits with the available information better than alternative interpretations."' 8 3 As Paul Thagard explains, "the best interpretation is one that provides the most coherent account of what we want to understand, considering both pieces of information that fit with each other and pieces of information that do not fit with each other."
34
In a connectionist model of the theory of explanatory coherence applied to legal decision making, the elements in the model are the evidence presented and propositions, explanations or hypotheses about this evidence. The links between the elements are based on "relations of explanation and analogy that hold between propositions." 3 ' For example, a hypothesis would have a positive link to a piece of evidence that it explains and a negative link to a contradictory hypothesis; contradictory pieces of evidence would be connected by a negative link. In a connectionist model, the activation of the elements is updated in parallel until the network iteratively converges on a configuration of activated elements that represents maximal satisfaction of the constraints imposed. Decision makers then choose the account or story that has the best coherence as indicated by the final pattern of activation among the elements.
This process of parallel constraint satisfaction is consistent with psychological understanding of juror decision making. In making sense of contradictory facts and testimony presented at trial and different explanations for the evidence presented by the opposing sides, jurors are often called upon to accept an account that best fits with the available evidence. 36 Pennington and Hastie's story model of juror decision making proposes that jurors: (1) presented at trial; (2) learn the verdict alternatives; and (3) match the story that they have accepted to the appropriate verdict. 37 The coherence of each proposed account or story is integral to its acceptability: While multiple stories may be considered, a more coherent story is more likely to be accepted.' 3 8 Connectionist models provide a formal structure for the mechanism by which the coherence of different stories is evaluated. Recently, these types of parallel constraint satisfaction models have been applied to explain decisions in both mock jury experiments and in actual jury trials. C.
Deliberative Coherence
Another way in which parallel constraint satisfaction models could be applied to legal decision making is more central to our point here. In a model of deliberative coherence, decision makers both evaluate potentially inconsistent goals and select actions to perform, "with the desirability of actions and goals determined by a judgment of . . . deliberative coherence," that is, the degree to which the system of interconnected actions and goals cohere. " ' As Thagard explains:
In brief, decision making is inference to the best plan. When people make decisions, they do not simply choose an action to perform, but rather adopt complex plans on the basis of a holistic assessment of various competing actions and goals. Choosing a plan is in part a matter of evaluating goals as well as actions. Choice is made by arriving at a plan or plans that involve actions and goals that are coherent with other actions and goals to which one is committed.1 4 1
Parallel constraint satisfaction modeling of deliberative coherence provides a formal model for how decision makers "mediate among the influence of multiple, salient, and often conflicting goals and do so in a way that results in reasonable behavior that is sensitive both to the desires of the individual and the opportunities and constraints of the environment." 1 42 In the context of civil cases, we suggest that decision makers attempt to reach a decision that balances multiple, potentially inconsistent goals and fits within the constraints of the legal decision-making task (e.g., jury instructions, verdict options, etc.). Just as parallel constraint satisfaction models of explanatory coherence frame the way in which legal decision makers map the trial evidence onto a coherent story and match that story to the verdict options, we propose that parallel constraint satisfaction models of deliberative coherence can frame the way in which legal decision makers map their myriad goals onto the available verdict options.
The elements in such a connectionist model of deliberative coherence are actions and goals. The links between these elements are based on whether they facilitate or inhibit each other, or are compatible or incompatible, and the degree to which this is so. 14 ' For example, the goal of engaging in moral cleansing may be connected by a positive link to the action of awarding a particular dollar amount, while the goal of appropriately compensating the plaintiff may be connected by a negative link to that same dollar award.
It is useful to think of these links as implementing the goal management principles described earlier. For example, a goal might be connected by positive links to more than one action (equifinality) and each possible action may be connected by positive links to more than one goal (multifinality). At the same time, the links between a goal and several different 141 Id. at 440 (describing deliberative coherence as "an account of the nature of human decision making that we think is more psychologically realistic than classical decision theory"). 14 5 Thus, the deliberative coherence of an action taken (e.g., a particular dollar award) to further a given goal (e.g., deterrence) depends in part on the explanatory coherence of the judgment that that action will facilitate the desired goal (e.g., beliefs about the degree to which the dollar award will in fact deter the defendant).
A simplified example illustrates these relationships. Imagine a decision maker has determined that a defendant is liable for a plaintiffs injuries and is attempting to determine whether a monetary award in the amount requested by the plaintiff or in the amount recommended by the defendant would be more appropriate. Imagine further that the decision maker has only the following goals: to express disapproval of the behavior, to cover the plaintiffs out-of-pocket expenses, and to not overcompensate the plaintiff. Figure 1 below represents these verdict options and decision maker goals in one possible connectionist framework. Solid lines represent compatible relationships and broken lines represent incompatible relationships. The decision maker might believe that either award would cover the plaintiffs expenses (equifinality), but that the larger amount would overcompensate the plaintiff (incompatibility). At the same time, the decision maker may 144 Id. at 444. See also Read et al., supra note 116, at 49 ("[Tlhe decision maker is predicted to choose the set of actions and goals that are most coherent and have the highest levels of activation. Actions and goals with high levels of activation are part of the plan to be performed."). In order to account for the "intrinsic desirability of some goals," goals may be linked to units that begin with different levels of activation to indicate "different degrees of desirability." Thagard & Millgram, supra note 140, at 444. 145 Read et al., supra note 116, at 49; Thagard & Millgram, supra note 140, at 442; THAGARD, supra note 119, believe that either amount would serve to express disapproval (equifinality), but believe that the larger amount may better convey this disapproval (best fit). Thus, the smaller award would serve to cover the plaintiffs expenses while not overcompensating the plaintiff, and would express to some degree the decision maker's disapproval of the defendant's behavior (multifinality). Yet, the larger award would serve to cover the plaintiffs expenses and would strongly express disapproval (multifinality), but would overcompensate the plaintiff (incompatibility). The decision maker would choose the award that best satisfies the various goals based on the strength of each goal, the relationships between the goals and the verdict options and the decision maker's beliefs about effectiveness of each verdict option for satisfying each goal (explanatory coherence). 4 
'
This conceptualization of legal decision making suggests that decision makers faced with different arrays of verdict options or possessing different combinations of goals may reach different judgments based on identical bodies of evidence, and it suggests the mechanism by which this could occur. Consistent with this notion, empirical research on punitive damages decision making suggests that changing the available verdict options can affect how decision makers utilize the remaining options to effectuate their goals. 147 Anderson and MacCoun found that jurors who were not allowed to award punitive damages in response to a personal injury scenario awarded more in pain and suffering than did those who were allowed to make an award of punitive damages. 4 were allowed to make unrestrained punitive damage awards.' Moreover, they found no differences in the total damages awarded by the two groups. 5 ' The results of these studies suggest that decision makers who are blocked from expressing their punitive intent through punitive damages find other mechanisms through which to satisfy their goals (i.e., equifinality).,' Similarly, if the defendant had already fulfilled, in whole or in part, one or more of the decision maker's goals, for example, by offering an apology, the decision maker might be expected to make use of the verdict options differently than if no apology were forthcoming or could be compelled.' Thus, just as different accounts of the events in a case compete for acceptance by the finder-of-fact, so too legal decision makers attempt to address multiple goals that compete to be satisfied. Verdict options, including a liability verdict and compensatory and punitive damages, may be used by legal decision makers in their attempts simultaneously to fulfill compensatory, expressive, punishment, deterrence, distributive justice and moral cleansing goals along with other normative and non-normative goals. Conceiving of civil verdicts as the outcome of attempts to use the available verdict options to satisfy these multiple, potentially competing goals in parallel provides a useful model for more thoroughly understanding such decisions.
CONCLUSION
A multi-motive conception of jurors, in contrast to traditional accounts of decision makers as focused on singular goals, provides a richer picture of the cognitive processing of legal decision making in civil cases. Considering goals that have not been traditionally considered by the law, such as differing notions of distributive justice, expressive and value concerns, reactions to taboo trade-offs and concerns for moral balance between the parties, explains a variety of empirically observed phenomena that are difficult to account for with 149 Greene et al., supra note 19, at 226. 160 Id. at 228 (i.e., the compensatory damages awarded by the group not allowed to award punitive damages were no different from the total of the compensatory and punitive damages in the group allowed to award both).
15' Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1406 ("[Tlhe legal line between punitive damages and compensatory damages does not accurately demarcate the presence of motives or perceptions of punishment.").
typical single motive accounts (e.g., the optimal deterrence model). Moreover, insight into how decision makers manage these diverse goals is gained by conceptualizing these multiple goals as interrelated in complex ways according to a set of goal management principles and dealt with through a system of cognitive processing that attempts to satisfy as many of these goals to the greatest extent possible through a process of parallel constraint satisfaction. 
